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1. Introduction
This article discusses problems related to implementing the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Russia. Although the contracting parties are obliged to execute the judgments of the 
ECtHR and are required to take all measures necessary to advance implementation*1, there are serious prob-
lems with enforcing the judgments in several member states. The binding role of the ECtHR’s judgments ‘is 
subject to doubts and questioning and, occasionally, an outright rejection’*2. Russia is one of nine countries 
highlighted in the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (the PACE report) on 
implementing the judgments of the ECtHR as having the highest number of non-implemented judgments.*3 
As many as 1,474 cases were waiting for execution in Russia as of the beginning of 2015*4, and it takes, on 
average, 9.7 years to implement a judgment of the ECtHR in Russia.*5 Russia has a ‘long list of outstanding 
issues concerning implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, most of which 
concern particularly serious human rights violations’, according to the PACE report.*6 Several structural 
problems contribute to the high number of Russian cases discussed by the ECtHR and the unsatis factory 
implementation of judgments. These include non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions, violation of 
the principle of legal certainty, a ‘supervisory review procedure’ (надзор) that allows reopening of the fi nal 
and enforceable judgments, poor conditions in detention on remand, torture and ill treatment in police cus-
tody, the actions of the security forces in the North Caucasus, various violations related to secret extradition 
ɲ See the Parliamentary Assembly’s report ‘Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’, doc. 
ɲɴɹɷɵ, ɺ.ɺ.ɳɱɲɶ, para. ɶɴ. Available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?fi leid=ɳɳɱɱɶ (most 
recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
ɳ W. Sadurski. Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, the accession of 
Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the idea of pilot judgments. – Human Rights Law Review 
ɳɱɱɺ (ɺ) / ɴ, p. ɵɱɶ. 
ɴ Other countries include Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine. For further information, 
see the PACE report (Note ɲ), p. ɴ. 
ɵ According to the data of the Committee of Ministers report ‘Supervision of the execution of judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights – Annual Report ɳɱɲɵ’, the countries with the largest numbers of unimplemented ECtHR judgments are 
Italy (ɳ,ɷɳɳ cases), Turkey (ɲ,ɶɱɱ cases), and the Russian Federation (ɲ,ɵɸɵ cases). 
ɶ PACE report (see Note ɲ), para. ɴɲ. 
ɷ Ibid., para. ɲɸ.
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to former Soviet republics in central Asia, and prohibition of LGBT assemblies.*7 As is argued by Klaas de 
Vries, a rapporteur with the PACE Committee on Legal Aﬀ airs and Human Rights, persisting problems with 
implementation of various judgments demonstrate ‘a clear lack of political will to execute the Court’s judg-
ments and to follow the Committee of Ministers’ recommendations’.*8 The relationship between Russia and 
the Council of Europe (hereinafter ‘CoE’) has always been ‘marked by a profound contradiction’*9. It can be 
agreed that, on account of the multi-layered legal order that exists in Europe today, tensions between indi-
vidual layers of the European legal order are unavoidable*10. Most probably, the tensions between the ECtHR 
and Russia reached their peak when, in December 2015, Russia adopted a law*11 (‘The Amended Law on the 
Constitutional Court’) refusing to acknowledge the binding force of the ECtHR’s judgments and empowering 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to declare said judgments unenforceable when imple-
mentation would be in confl ict with the Constitution of Russia. The aim of the current paper is to analyse the 
enforceability of the judgments of the ECtHR in Russia, considering certain amendments to the Law on the 
Constitutional Court and relevant case law of the Constitutional Court, and to assess the regulatory changes 
and court practice from the perspective of obligations Russia has undertaken as a  member of the CoE. 
2. Enforceable judgments as the ECtHR’s main strength 
The ECtHR has been praised as the strongest and the most eﬃ  cient oversight system in international 
human rights law*12, ‘a crown jewel of the world’s most advanced international system for protecting civil 
and political liberties’*13. The associated supranational enforcement mechanism, which enables citizens, 
often disadvantaged in their home countries, to enforce their rights at the international level, is regarded 
as the main strength of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR*14).*15 From the perspective of 
citizens, the ECtHR is often ‘a last chance of securing redress for abuses they have suﬀ ered at the hands of 
their government’*16. The mechanism for individual petitioning is supposed to help ‘bridge the gap between 
the lofty goals of international human rights law and the imperfect execution of human rights norms at the 
national and local levels’*17. Successful and expeditious implementation of the judgments of the ECtHR on 
the national level is vital for the ECtHR, as both the credibility and the legitimacy of the system depend on 
it.*18 However, co-operation within the CoE in accordance with its goals and standards and also implemen-
tation of the rights under the Convention and the decisions of the ECtHR remain the duty and opportunity 
of governments. For its eﬀ ectiveness, the CoE system ultimately relies on ‘the good will of nation-states 
whose commitment to the ECHR system is based on traditional, international-law type of obligations’.*19 
ɸ Ibid., para. ɲɴ.ɴ. 
ɹ Ibid., para. ɲɸ.
ɺ J.-P. Massias. Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten years wasted? – Russie. Nei. Visions ɳɱɱɹ/ɲɶ (translated from French 
by Nicola Bigwood), p. ɵ. 
ɲɱ European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission). Opinion No. ɹɴɳ/ɳɱɲɶ: Interim opinion on the 
amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Constitutional Court’ of the Russian Federation. CDL-AD(ɳɱɲɷ)ɱɱɶ. 
ɲɶ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ, Strasbourg, para. ɶɺ (hereinafter ‘the Venice Commission’).
ɲɲ Federal constitutional law from ɲɵ December ɳɱɲɶ, No. ɸ-FKZ, ‘On amending the federal constitutional law “On [the] Con-
stitutional Court of the Russian Federation”’.
ɲɳ S. Sweet. A cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe. – Global Constitutionalism 
ɳɱɲɳ/ɲ, p. ɶɴ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɲɸ/Sɳɱɵɶɴɹɲɸɲɲɱɱɱɱɷɳ.
ɲɴ L.R. Helfer. Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European 
human rights regime. – European Journal of International Law ɳɱɱɹ (ɲɺ) / ɲ, p. ɲɳɶ. 
ɲɵ In this article also referred to as ‘the Convention’. 
ɲɶ R.A. Cichowski. Civil society and the European Court of Human Rights. – J. Christoﬀ ersen, M.R. Madsen (eds). The European 
Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press ɳɱɲɲ, p. ɸɺ. See also C. Hillebrecht. 
Implementing international human rights law at home: Domestic politics and the European Court of Human Rights. – Human 
Rights Review ɳɱɲɳ/ɲɴ, pp. ɳɸɺ–ɴɱɲ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694495.003.0005.
ɲɷ C. Schreck. Russian Law on rejecting human rights courts violates Constitution, experts say. Radio Free Europe, 
ɲɷ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/russian-law-on-rejecting-human-rights-courts-violates-constitu-
tion-experts-say/ɳɸɵɴɳɲɳɶ.html (most recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɲɸ C. Hillebrecht. (see Note ɲɶ), p. ɳɸɺ.
ɲɹ D. Anagnostou, A. Mungiu-Pippidi. Domestic implementation of human rights judgments in Europe: Legal infrastructure 
and government eﬀ ectiveness matter. – European Journal of International Law ɳɱɲɵ (ɳɶ) / ɲ, p. ɳɱɷ.
ɲɺ W. Sadurski (see Note ɳ), p. ɴɺɺ.
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Under Article 46 (1) of the ECHR, the contracting parties undertake to abide by the fi nal judgment of 
the ECtHR in any case to which they are parties. State bodies have an obligation to ‘comply with the legal 
situation under the ECHR but also to remove all obstacles in their domestic legal system that might prevent 
an adequate redress of the applicant’s situation’*20. States can choose among the means of execution they 
consider to be appropriate; however, ‘the State does not have the choice to execute or not to execute, [and] 
that choice is limited only to the means of execution’.*21 Compliance with the fi nal judgment covers redress 
in the individual case at hand, but, in addition, the state may be required to revise its legislation or to reform 
its administrative or judicial practice in order to render its legal system in conformity with the ECHR.*22 
Notwithstanding the fl exibility granted to the states in choosing appropriate means of execution, problems 
with implementation remain in several member states, including Russia. 
3. The position of the ECHR and the judgments 
of the ECtHR in the Russian legal system 
3.1. Changing interpretation by the Constitutional Court 
Pursuant to Article 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution, the universally recognised norms of international 
law and the international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of 
the country’s legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation fi xes other 
rules than those envisaged by law, those rules of the international agreement shall be applied. Since Russia 
ratifi ed the ECHR in 1998, it has been an integral part of the Russian legal system. However, as the inter-
pretation of Article 15 (4) has diﬀ ered considerably from one time period to another, also the position of the 
ECHR in Russia’s legal system has been a highly disputed question among Russian legal scholars and in the 
practice of the Constitutional Court. 
In the fi rst years following the ratifi cation of the ECHR, the approach to the Convention was generally 
favourable. In 2001, the Constitution Court established that the decisions of Russia’s institutions must be 
in accordance with the ECtHR.*23 However, according to an interpretation by the Constitutional Court in 
2007, the words ‘are part of its legal system’ in Article 15 (4) of the Constitution mean simply that ‘inter-
national agreements, including the Convention and decisions of the ECtHR, should only be taken into 
account in passing decisions’ (italics in the original).*24 This indicates a negative turn with regard to the role 
of the Convention and the ECtHR in the Russian legal system. Russian human rights lawyer Kirill Koroteev 
explains: ‘In Russian law, the words take into account have a clear meaning: that which should be taken 
into account is not obligatory’ (italics in the original).*25 
Over the past few years, the ECtHR has issued several judgments against Russia in politically sensitive 
cases, which have received strong disapproval in Russia*26 and have resulted in an increasing reluctance to 
execute of judgments of the ECtHR. The president of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, has criticised 
the ECtHR for exhibiting more and more pronounced judicial activism and orientation toward revealing 
structural defects of national legal systems.*27 According to Zorkin, the ECtHR does not give suﬃ  cient rec-
ognition to the socio-historical context of the various individual countries. He argues:
ɳɱ Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Maestri v. Italy, Application ɴɺɸɵɹ/ɺɹ from ɲɸ February ɳɱɱɵ, para. 
ɵɸ. 
ɳɲ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), para. ɶɸ.
ɳɳ Ibid., para. ɶɶ. 
ɳɴ K. Koroteev. The European factor in Russian justice. Open Democracy News Analysis, ɳɷ June ɳɱɱɹ. Available at https://
www.opendemocracy.net/node/ɵɶɳɵɶ/pdf (most recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɳɵ Ibid. 
ɳɶ Ibid.
ɳɷ For example, the Grand Chamber’s judgment of October ɳɱɲɱ in Markin v. Russia triggered a strong backlash within Rus-
sia. See, e.g., L. Mälksoo. Markin v Russia. – The American Journal of International Law ɳɱɲɳ (ɲɱɷ) / ɵ, pp. ɹɴɷ–ɹɵɳ. 
Controversial cases also include the ECtHR’s Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, of ɵ July ɳɱɲɴ (applications ɲɲɲɶɸ/ɱɵ and 
ɲɶɲɷɳ/ɱɶ), involving prisoners’ right to vote, and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, of ɳɵ June ɳɱɲɵ (applica-
tion No. ɲɵɺɱɳ/ɱɵ). 
ɳɸ V.D. Zorkin. Challenges of implementation of the Convention on Human Rights. Presentation at the international confer-
ence on ‘enhancing national mechanisms for eﬀ ective implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights’, held 
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The signifi cance of more full consideration of a particular socio-historical (socio-cultural) context 
of the Convention’s realization by the European Court can be demonstrated by the widely known 
case ‘Konstantin Markin v Russia’*28, which became an impulse for Russia for elaboration of the 
role of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the mechanism of implementation of 
the Convention.*29
On 6 December 2013, considering the implementation of the judgment in the controversial case Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia, the Constitutional Court held that when a judgment of the ECtHR contradicts a prior ruling 
of the Constitutional Court on the case in question, the Russian Constitutional Court should have the fi nal say 
in the execution of the relevant judgment by the ECtHR. The Constitutional Court explained that when a court 
of general jurisdiction has reopened proceedings in order to implement the judgment of the ECtHR and it 
cannot enforce that judgment of the ECtHR without at the same time disregarding provisions of domestic law, 
the court must suspend the proceedings and request the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of 
such provisions. The Constitutional Court did not directly assess the place of the ECHR and judgments of the 
ECtHR in the Russian legal order; however, it held that when fi nding the challenged legal provisions to be in 
accordance with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court would determine possible constitu tional means of 
implementation of the relevant judgment of the ECtHR within the limits of its competence.*30
In June 2015, when Russia had missed the deadline for submitting an action plan for just satisfaction 
awarded to shareholders of Yukos*31, the issue of the relationship between international law and national 
law was raised in the State Duma. Ninety-three Russian deputies asked the Constitutional Court for a clari-
fi cation as to the constitutionality of several pieces of legislation, including the federal law titled ‘On Rati-
fi cation of the ECHR’ and the federal law ‘On International Treaties’. The deputies claimed that the con-
tested regulations included provisions unconstitutionally obliging Russian authorities to implement the 
judgments of the ECtHR even when they are in confl ict with the Russian Constitution.*32 According to 
Valery Zorkin, one of the reasons for this request was the judgment of the ECtHR in the case Anchugov and 
Gladkov v. Russia.*33 In its judgment of 14 July 2015, the Constitutional Court*34 held that the contested 
provisions were not actually unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court also explained that, in accordance 
with Article 46 of the ECHR, Russia ‘recognized ipso facto and without special agreement the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Human Rights as obligatory’*35and that the ECHR was an integral part of the Rus-
sian legal system.*36 However, despite those statements, the Constitutional Court concluded that, although 
the Russian Constitution and the ECHR are based on the same basic values, in the event of a contradiction 
between the two with respect to the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, preference should be given to 
the Constitution and therefore Russia is not obliged to follow the judgments of the ECtHR literally when 
the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to Russia’s constitutional values.*37 The Constitutional 
Court also stressed that the participation of the Russian Federation in any international treaty relationship 
does not mean giving up national sovereignty, that neither the ECHR nor the legal positions of the ECtHR 
based on it can cancel the priority of the Constitution, and that the implementation of international treaties 
and judgments of international organs is conditional upon these being in accordance with the Russian Con-
stitution*38 According to the Constitutional Court, when the ECtHR’s interpretation of the provisions of the 
in St Petersburg on ɳɳ–ɳɴ October ɳɱɲɶ. Written notes available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/News/Documents/Report%ɳɱ
for%ɳɱɳɳ%ɳɱOctober.docx (most recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ), pp. ɳ–ɴ. 
ɳɹ Grand Chamber’s judgment of October ɳɱɲɱ in Markin v. Russia (application No. ɴɱɱɸɹ/ɱɷ).
ɳɺ V.D. Zorkin (See note ɳɸ), pp. ɷ–ɸ.
ɴɱ Judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court of ɷ December ɳɱɲɴ, No. ɳɸ-P.
ɴɲ See Committee of Ministers. Case against the Russian Federation (Case No. ɲɹ, ɲɳɴɱth meeting), ɲɲ June ɳɱɲɶ. Available 
at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CM/Del/Dec%ɳɹɳɱɲɶ%ɳɺɲɳɴɱ/ɲɹ&Language=lanFrench&Ver=original&
Site=CM&BackColorInternet=DBDCFɳ&BackColorIntranet=FDCɹɷɵ&BackColorLogged=FDCɹɷɵ&direct=true (most 
recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
ɴɳ See Section ɲ, para. ɶ of Judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ, of ɲɵ July ɳɱɲɶ (hereinafter ‘Judg-
ment No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ’).
ɴɴ V.D. Zorkin (see Note ɳɸ), p. ɲɲ.
ɴɵ Judgment No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ
ɴɶ Ibid., Section ɲ, para. ɲ. 
ɴɷ Ibid., Section ɳ.
ɴɸ Ibid., Section ɵ, para. ɳ. 
ɴɹ Ibid., Section ɳ.ɳ, paras ɳ and ɴ.
Kerttu Mäger
Enforcing the Judgments of the ECtHR in Russia in Light of the Amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court
18 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 24/2016
ECHR is not in accordance with the principles and norms of the Russian Constitution, Russia may in excep-
tional cases ‘withdraw from the implementation of the obligations imposed on it, when such derogation is 
the only possible way to avoid violations of the fundamental principles and norms of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation’*39. According to Zorkin in his capacity as president of the Constitutional Court, the 
latter ruling, ‘as the previous judgment of 6 December, 2013 […] is not sensational, because it only repro-
duces and develops the legal position on the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation when 
executing the ECtHR decisions’.*40 However, an expert on Russian constitutional law, Maria Smirnova, 
argues that the ruling of the Constitutional Court ‘clearly signifi es a change in the political attitude towards 
the implementation of decisions of the European Court’*41.
Placing the Russian Constitution at the apex of the hierarchy of norms within the Russian legal system 
was viewed by the Venice Commission as an internal rationale for the decision taken.*42 At the same time, 
the external rationale is refl ected in the position of the Constitutional Court according to which 
[a]n international treaty is binding for its participants in the meaning which can be elucidated 
with the help of the adduced rule of interpretation […] if the ECtHR, interpreting a provision of the 
ECHR […] gives to a notion used in the Convention a meaning other than the ordinary one or car-
ries out interpretation contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, the state, in respect 
of which the judgment has been passed on this case, has the right to refuse to execute it as it goes 
beyond the obligations, voluntarily taken by this state upon itself when ratifying the Convention.*43
The Constitutional Court also stressed that, from the principles of interpretation set forth in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law on Treaties, when the interpretation of the ECtHR diverges from the imperative norms 
of customary international law (jus cogens), including the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference with internal aﬀ airs of states, one can derive the conclusion that execution of the judgment is not 
obligatory.*44 The Constitutional Court concluded that decisions of an authorised interstate body, including 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, cannot be executed ‘if the interpretation of the provi-
sions of an international treaty, that this decision is based on, violates relevant provisions of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation’.*45 Therefore, proceeding from the positions of the Constitutional Court, one can 
conclude that, although Russia has voluntarily become a member of the CoE and has subjected herself to the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR, whenever a judgment of the ECtHR infringes the principle of sovereignty or is in 
confl ict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russia may refuse to implement that judgment. 
It should be noted that the executive branch has a very important role in the process of refusing to 
implement the judgments of the ECtHR. Namely, when the government or the President of the Russian 
Federation consider a judgment of the ECtHR impossible to enforce for reason of a confl ict with the Russian 
Constitution, at the request of these authorities the Constitutional Court should provide its interpretation. 
When the Constitutional Court concludes that the judgment of the ECtHR is incompatible with the Consti-
tution, it shall not be implemented. The Constitutional Court also proposed that a special legal mechanism 
be created in order to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution in the implementation of ECtHR rulings.*46 
It is remarkable that the main conclusions of the Constitutional Court directly mirrored the position taken 
by the President’s representative to the Constitutional Court, Mikhail Krotov. Although the presence of a 
President’s representative on the Constitutional Court is highly questionable in terms of the principle of 
separation of powers, this has been the reality of Russia since 1996.*47
Valery Zorkin has emphasised that ‘[t]he main problem, which the Constitutional Court of Russia has 
faced within its work, is the need of simultaneous fulfi lment of two not always well-combined tasks: har-
monizing Russia’s legal system with the all-European legal expanse, on the one hand, and protection of its 
ɴɺ Ibid., Section ɳ.ɳ, para. ɵ.
ɵɱ V.D. Zorkin (see Note ɳɸ), p. ɲɳ.
ɵɲ M. Smirnova. Russian Constitutional Court aﬃ  rms Russian Constitution’s supremacy over ECtHR decisions, ɲɶ July ɳɱɲɷ. 
EJIL Talk!: Blog of the European Journal of International Law. Available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/russian-constitu-
tional-court-aﬃ  rms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/ (most recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɵɳ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), para. ɲɹ. 
ɵɴ Translation of this section of the Judgment No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ is taken from the report of Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), 
para. ɳɳ. For original text, see Section ɴ, para. ɴ of Judgment No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ.
ɵɵ Section ɴ, para. ɴ of Judgment No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ.
ɵɶ Ibid., Section ɴ, para. ɺ. 
ɵɷ  Section ɲ, paras ɵ and ɶ of the resolution part of Judgment No. ɳɲ-P/ɳɱɲɶ.
ɵɸ For further information, see M. Smirnova (see Note ɵɲ). 
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own constitutional identity, on the other’.*48 Recent case law demonstrates that the Constitutional Court 
has found the necessary equilibrium in building its constitutional identity on the principle of sovereignty, 
overriding that part of its constitution declaring the supremacy of international law and thereby violating 
the international obligations that Russia has undertaken. 
3.2. Amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court 
The decision of the Constitutional Court issued on 14 June 2015, analysed above, is also signifi cant because 
mirroring this judgment almost point for point, in December 2015, the State Duma and the Federation Coun-
cil approved the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, the new legislation gives insight into 
how the Constitutional Court is likely to interpret the key terms of the law in the future.*49 Pursuant to the 
Amended Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court may consider the possibility of enforce-
ment of the decision of an interstate body for the protection of human rights and freedoms at the request 
of the federal executive authority that is competent to operate in the fi eld of protecting Russia’s sovereign 
interests*50. The regulation allows the Constitutional Court to decide whether the decision of an international 
court, such as the European Court of Human Rights, should or should not be enforced in Russia. Neither the 
ECtHR nor any other specifi c court is explicitly mentioned in the law; instead, the term ‘an interstate body 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of a person’ (межгосударственный орган по защите прав и 
свобод человека) is used. The Constitutional Court can consider the relevant case in order to resolve uncer-
tainties as to the possibility of enforcing judgments of interstate bodies for the protection of human rights and 
freedoms when the interpretation of relevant treaties issued by these bodies is presumably in confl ict with the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation*51. The Constitutional Court shall consider the case from the point of 
view of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and the legal regulation of the rights and freedoms 
of man and citizen established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.*52 If the Constitutional Court 
recognises the interstate body’s ruling to be unenforceable, any action aimed at the satisfaction under the 
relevant decision cannot be performed*53; hence, the decision will not be enforced in practice. 
A report published by the Venice Commission is highly critical of the amended Law on the Constitu-
tional Court, especially regarding its strict ‘black or white approach’. They argue: 
If the Constitutional Court cannot ‘remove the uncertainty’ about the contradiction between the Consti-
tution and the international decision […] no measures (acts) aimed at the enforcement of it may be taken 
(adopted) within the territory of the Russian Federation. The amendments thus adopt an ‘all or nothing’ 
solution: they move from the premise that possible confl icts have to be settled either through refusing 
the implementation of ECtHR judgments – which is inadmissible – or through declaring that there is no 
confl ict between these judgments and the Russian Constitution, a ‘black or white’ alternative.*54
On one hand, states are by no means obliged to use measures of execution that are unconstitutional in the 
respective country.*55 According to the position of the Venice Commission, contradictions between national 
systems and rulings of the ECtHR are possible, but state bodies must fi nd appropriate solutions for reconciling 
the provisions of the ECHR with the national constitution. This can be done eﬀ ectively via means of dialogue, 
which has been successfully used between Germany and the ECtHR; through interpretation; or by means of 
reforms to national legislation.*56 However, the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court does not provide for 
the option that if a certain measure is not in accordance with the Russian Constitution, another measure should 
be chosen in order to reconcile the domestic law and the judgment of the ECtHR and enable implementation 
the relevant judgment. The law is ‘very strict in fi rmly stipulating that the execution as a whole is blocked’.*57 
ɵɹ V.D. Zorkin (see Note ɳɸ), p. ɲ. 
ɵɺ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), paras ɲɴ, ɳɶ. 
ɶɱ See Article ɴɳ of the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court. 
ɶɲ See Article ɴɷ (ɳ) of the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court. 
ɶɳ See Article ɲɱɵɴ of the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court.
ɶɴ See Article ɲɱɵɵ of the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court. 
ɶɵ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), para. ɸɴ. 
ɶɶ Ibid., para. ɹɴ. 
ɶɷ Ibid., paras ɺɸ, ɲɱɱ.
ɶɸ Ibid., para. ɹɴ. 
Kerttu Mäger
Enforcing the Judgments of the ECtHR in Russia in Light of the Amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court
20 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 24/2016
Another highly problematic aspect is that the amendments have weakened the position of Russian citi-
zens in defending their rights. The possibility of declaring a judgment of the ECtHR unenforceable means 
also that the state can refuse payment of the just satisfaction rewarded to an applicant. Moreover, according 
to the amended Article 47 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court can reach its 
decision without holding a hearing. This means that the applicant is not able to present his or her argu-
ments, even though being clearly aﬀ ected by the decision to enforce or not to enforce the judgment of the 
ECtHR. This approach violates the principle of a fair trial.*58 As was observed by the Venice Commission, 
‘[o]nly the position of the federal authority which submitted the complaint appears to be relevant, while the 
position of the people concerned may be formally disregarded’.*59 
An important criticism of the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court has been that, because the 
Russian Constitution clearly acknowledges the binding nature of international law and treaty obligations in 
its Article 15 (4), implementing the amended Law on the Constitutional Court is itself in confl ict with Rus-
sia’s constitution while also violating Russia’s international treaty obligations. European Union constitu-
tional law professor Dmitry Kochenov, at the University of Groningen, argues that, under Russia’s constitu-
tion, treaties signed by Russia, the ECHR among them, are the ‘supreme force in the land’. It is controversial 
that when, on one hand, the objective of the law is defending Russia’s constitution, applying it would itself 
constitute a violation the Constitution.*60 Bill Bowring, a professor of international human rights law at the 
University of London’s Birkbeck College, agrees that the law contradicts the Russian Constitution, along 
with the country’s 1998 law ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights.*61 
Andrei Klishas, the head of the Committee on Constitutional Legislation of the Federation Council, 
claims that the aim behind the law is to stimulate the government to implement the judgments of inter-
national courts, since under the new legislation they cannot independently decide whether or not to imple-
ment the decision and instead have to turn to the Constitutional Court.*62 This statement obviously has 
no basis in either domestic Russian or international law, because the government itself does not have any 
grounds to refuse implementation; on the contrary, the government is obliged to secure implementation of 
the ECtHR judgments. Under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, states are bound 
to respect ratifi ed international agreements.*63 The Venice Commission takes the following position:
A possible declaration of unenforceability of a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
violates Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is an unequivocal legal 
obligation and includes the obligation for the State to abide by the interpretation and the applica-
tion of the Convention made by the Court in cases brought against it.*64 
An argument according to which judgments of the ECtHR should not be executed when the interpretation 
provided by the ECtHR is not in accordance with Russian constitutional principles is clearly not valid from 
the perspective of international law. Under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, the 
provisions of a state’s internal law cannot be invoked to justify failure to perform the state’s duties, and this 
is applicable in the context of the ECHR*65. 
Head of the Russian Constitutional Court Zorkin has argued that the Constitutional Court exercises the 
opportunity provided by the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court only when the Russian Constitution 
protects the rights of the citizens to a greater extent than the ECtHR does.*66 According to the report of the 
Venice Commission, it is very unlikely that the ECtHR would fi nd a violation to exist if the domestic legal 
order indeed provided for a higher level of protection.*67 The ECHR sets forth minimum standards, and 
countries are free to provide for a higher level of protection if they so wish. According to Article 53 of the 
ɶɹ Ibid., paras ɹɶ, ɲɱɲ.
ɶɺ Ibid., para. ɹɶ. 
ɷɱ As cited by C. Schreck (see Note ɲɷ).
ɷɲ Ibid. 
ɷɳ Совет Федерации утвердил приоритет КС над решениями международных судов. ɺ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ. Pravo.ru. Available at 
http://pravo.ru/news/view/ɲɳɵɸɶɸ/ (most recently accessed on ɲ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɷɴ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), para. ɺɸ.
ɷɵ Ibid., para. ɺɺ.
ɷɶ Ibid., para. ɺɸ.
ɷɷ Президент объяснил необходимость приоритета Конституционного суда над ЕСПЧ. Pravo.ru. ɲɵ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ. Available 
at http://pravo.ru/news/view/ɲɳɵɹɹɷ/ (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɷɸ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), para. ɸɷ.
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ECHR, ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or 
under any other agreement to which it is a party’. Therefore, when Russian standards are higher than the 
standards of the ECHR, minimum standards must be followed and there should not be any grounds for the 
ECtHR to fi nd a violation of the Convention. 
3.3. The ideas behind the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court 
The sovereignty of Russia can be seen as the guiding principle behind the new legislation and preceding judg-
ments of the Constitutional Court. Alexander Manov, an assistant professor at Kutafi n Moscow State Law 
University, has argued that ‘[i]ndeed, human rights are sovereign, but the state is sovereign too’.*68 He views 
the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court as a precaution in case there are attempts to exert external 
pressure on Russia*69. Also Valery Zorkin has stressed that ‘interaction of the European and national legal 
orders is impossible in conditions of subordination’*70 and that the steps taken by the Constitutional Court are 
based on the aspiration to safeguard ourselves from situations, fraught with serious complication 
of the relations of Russia with the ECtHR and with the Council of Europe as a whole. The ques-
tion regards the situations when the ECtHR decisions, intruding into the sphere of the national 
 sovereignty of Russia, are fraught with more substantial violations of rights of Russian citizens than 
those, which the Strasbourg Court is objecting to.*71 
The political relevance of the Amended Law on the Constitutional Court is ‘underlined by the fact that the 
submission of the complaint of the federal authority before the Constitutional Court is seen as an aspect of 
the competence of that authority “for protecting the interests of the Russian Federation”’.*72 
The Amended Law on the Constitutional Court meshes well with the Russian concept of ‘sovereign democ-
racy’, a creation of Vladislav Surkov*73. In a nutshell, such a Russian approach to democracy means that 
democratic values are neither contested nor rejected [,] but subordinated to national interests. This 
logic is based on the refusal to undergo foreign supervision and meddling. Yet the decisions of the 
CoE are seen as such in Russia, and are thus a source of irritation and misunderstanding.*74
3.5. Implementation of the amended Law on the Constitutional Court 
On 2 February 2016, the Ministry of Justice lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court in connection 
with the ruling of the ECtHR in the case Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, of 3 July 2013*75. This case is the 
fi rst one in which the Constitutional Court will decide whether the execution of the decision of the ECtHR 
is in accordance with the Russian Constitution or not and, therefore, whether it shall be executed or not. 
The case pertains to the question of prisoners’ voting rights. Applicants Sergey Anchugov and Vladimir 
Gladkov turned to the ECtHR with the claim that their right to vote had been violated. Both applicants were 
convicted of murder and other criminal oﬀ ences and barred from voting in elections to the State Duma and 
in presidential elections, under Article 32 (3) of the Russian Constitution. The ECtHR held that the blanket 
ban on allowing prisoners to vote violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, which provides for the right 
to free elections. 
The case brought along extensive discussion among the legal scholars and practitioners in the fi eld 
of human rights protection and as a novel step, several amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the 
ɷɹ As cited by Yekaterina Sinelschikova. International courts’ rulings no longer enforceable in Russia. Russia Direct, ɲɱ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ. 
Available at http://www.russia-direct.org/russian-media/international-courts-rulings-no-longer-enforceable-russia (most 
recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
ɷɺ Ibid. 
ɸɱ Ibid.
ɸɲ V.D. Zorkin (see Note ɳɸ), p. ɲɵ.
ɸɳ Venice Commission (see Note ɲɱ), para. ɹɷ. 
ɸɴ See, e.g., В. Сурков. Национализация будущего: параграфы про суверенную демократию. – Эксперт. ɳɱɱɷ (ɲɳ) / ɷ. 
ɸɵ J.-P. Massias (see Note ɺ), p. ɲɵ.
ɸɶ Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia [ɳɱɲɴ] ECtHR, applications ɲɲɲɶɸ/ɱɵ and ɲɶɲɷɳ/ɱɶ (ɵ July ɳɱɲɴ). 
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Constitutional Court by distinguished experts*76. The legal scholars advised in their amicus curiae brief*77 
that the Constitutional Court should decide not whether compliance of the Russian Federation with its 
obligation to execute judgments of the ECtHR is possible or impossible but, instead, whether a particular 
method of execution of the judgments is possible or impossible from the perspective of the Constitution. 
They argued that the confl ict between the provisions of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention and Article 
32 (3) of the Constitution can and should be resolved by the Constitutional Court by means of interpreta-
tion of this constitutional provision allowing the establishment of a higher standard of human rights and 
freedoms in harmony with the requirements of the Convention. Experts explained that such an approach 
is dominant in European legal systems and, additionally, is well established in the practice of the Consti-
tutional Court. For example, the Constitutional Court followed this approach when discussing the issue of 
carrying out the death penalty in Russia and decided to establish a moratorium on the death penalty, tak-
ing into account the special nature of international obligations Russia has undertaken and, secondly, the 
evolution of international legal standards of human rights. They advise taking similar factors into account 
in the consideration of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia. As can be seen, the experts’ recommendations to 
overcome the confl ict between Russian domestic law and the provisions of Protocol 1 of the ECHR are very 
much in line with the positions of the Venice Commission discussed above. 
4. Conclusions 
Although Article 46 of the ECHR does not leave room for ‘cherry-picking’ in enforcing the judgments, the 
Constitutional Court has suggested that Russian authorities should indeed engage in cherry-picking and 
enforce only those judgments that are proved to be in accordance with the Russian Constitution as inter-
preted by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has clearly expressed its view of the role and 
meaning of the ECHR and ECtHR in the Russian legal system as being contingent on approval by the 
Constitutional Court. Instead of this all-or-nothing approach, confl icts between the domestic legislation 
and the ECHR could be resolved through interpretation and dialogue, as advised by the Venice Commis-
sion and also by Russian legal experts. Although at the time of writing, the Constitutional Court has not yet 
declared any ECtHR judgments unenforceable, when deciding that, for reasons of confl ict with Russian 
constitutional principles, the Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia judgment or any other judgment is impos-
sible to implement, Russia would clearly violate its obligations under the ECHR. Such conduct is unprec-
edented in the CoE, but it might be a threatening example for other countries to follow. The amended Law 
on the Constitutional Court poses a threat to the eﬀ ectiveness of the ECtHR and creates an even greater 
stumbling block to dialogue between Russia and the ECtHR. It can severely harm the protection of rights 
and freedoms of Russian citizens and access to the protection provided via the ECHR. Still, as the majority 
of the ECtHR’s judgments are not politically sensitive, there is a great chance that the authorities in Russia 
will not apply the mechanisms provided by the amended Law on the Constitutional Court in a substantial 
number of cases and will continue to enforce the international judgments. 
ɸɷ One amicus curiae brief was submitted by experts of Institute for Law and Public Policy (http://ilpp.ru/en/), a Moscow based 
independent NGO, one of the leading Russian think tanks conducting research, educational activities and publishing in the 
sphere of constitutional law and another by group of legal scholars: G.I. Bogush, an assistant professor of criminal law and 
criminology at the law department of Lomonosov Moscow State University; K.I. Degtyarev, lecturer at the School of Law and 
Social Justice of Liverpool University (United Kingdom); G.A. Esakov, a professor and head of department of criminal law at 
Higher School of Economics; M.T. Timofeev, lecturer at the law faculty of the European Humanities University (Lithuania). 
See, for further information: Институт права и публичной политики. Заключение о толковании статьи 32 (часть 3) 
Конституции Российской Федерации для целей определения возможности исполнения постановления Европейского 
Суда по правам человека от 4 июля 2013 года по делу «Анчугов и Гладков против Российской Федерации». 28.03.2016. 
Available: http://www.ilpp.ru/netcat_fi les/userfi les/Litigation_Treinings/2016%20Amicus%20Curiae%20Brief%20(Anchu-
gov%20i%20Gladkov).pdf (most recently accessed on 1.7.2016) and Г.И. Богуш, К.И.Дегтярёв, Г.А Есаков, М.Т.Тимофеев. 
Письменные соображения по существу дела, касающегося запроса Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации о 
разрешении вопроса о возможности исполнения Постановления Европейского Суда по правам человека от 4 июля 
2013 года по жалобам №№ 11157/04 и 15162/05 «Анчугов и Гладков против Российской Федерации». 23.03.2016. 
Available at http://chr-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Anchugov-and-Gladkov-Amicus-Brief.pdf (most recently 
accessed on 1.7.2016). 
ɸɸ Г.И. Богуш et al. (See note ɸɷ.)
